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Abstract
Mirai is botnet which targets out-of-date Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices. The dis-
ruptive Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack last year has hit major Internet
companies, causing intermittent service for millions of Internet users. Since the affected
devices typically do not support firmware update, it becomes challenging to expel these
vulnerable devices in the wild.
Both industry and academia have made great efforts in amending the situation. How-
ever, none of these efforts is simple to deploy, and at the same time effective in solving
the problem. In this work, we design a collaborative defense strategy to tackle Mirai.
Our key idea is to take advantage of human involvement in the least aggressive way. In
particular, at a negotiated time slot, a customer is required to reboot the compromised
device, then a “white” Mirai operated by the manufacture breaks into the clean-state
IoT devices immediately. The “white” Mirai expels other malicious Mirai variants,
blocks vulnerable ports, and keeps a heart-beat connection with the server operated by
the manufacturer. Once the heart-beat is lost, the server re-implants the “white” Mirai
instantly. We have implemented a full prototype of the designed system, and the results
show that our system can evade Mirai attacks effectively.
Keywords: Mirai, Botnet, IoT
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1 Introduction
In October 21st, 2016, Dyn, an infrastructure vendor, which serves Internet’s top giants, such as
Netflix and Twitter, was attacked by the record Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack [2].
The attack was later found originated from a botnet malware – Mirai. It was the same botnet
malware that attacked an security researcher’s blog website and had the record 620 Gpbs stream
in September 21st [5]. The Mirai malware mainly targets digital video recorders (DVRs) and IP
cameras, which are mainly old and low-end products which have no firmware update capability. In
addition, since the firmware is read only, the Mirai code can only stay in the DRAM of the device;
rebooting the device also wipes the Mirai code. That being said, once infected, the only recourse
is to wait for these devices to be rebooted since there is no path to remediation through any type
of reconfiguration. Given the large amount of these vulnerable devices, and the fact that there is
no way patch them, Mirai based attacks have become a time bomb which no one can defuse
Under the pressure from media, some manufacturers claimed they were to recall vulnerable prod-
ucts linked to this massive DDoS attack. For example, Hangzhou Xiongmai Technology planned
to recall 4.3 million Internet-connected camera products from the U.S market [1]. Although the
company invests a huge time and energy to amend the situation, it only mitigates later attacks,
simply because device users have no incentive to cooperate in the recall process. They are not
willing to spend time on packing these devices and sending them back, because the Mirai malware
does not affect the normal operations of the compromised devices. As a result, there are still a lot
of vulnerable devices remaining in the wild.
When passive recalling turned out to be inefficient, the manufacturer could also actively contact
customers to perform remote diagnose. If the device is found compromised, the customer agent
could explain the consequence of leaving the device in the wild, and urge the customer to replace the
device for free. However, a manufacturer may have millions of products sold around the world [1].
It is not practical for the customer service to contact each user to fix the problem.
Academia is also active in solving the Mirai problem. In [17], the authors propose a fancy idea
to deploy a “white” Mirai-like system. The government is required to record vulnerable products
and push the related manufacturers to fix the problem. This solution inherits a bunch of code from
Mirai. Notably, like the malicious Mirai, the “white” Mirai actively scans neighbour vulnerable
devices, and infects them. The infected devices then become immune to any other similar attack, as
a result of blocked ports. As the “white” Mirai spread itself through infection, it exhausts resources
and imposes heavy overhead for the resource-constraint devices. Furthermore, there is a combat
between the “white” and real Mirai. Only the winner takes control of the device. In fact, Mirai
has already infected millions of devices which has a good chance to win the game. In this sense,
the solution is non-deterministic. Last but not least, the solution has legal concerns. Although this
Mirai-like system is conducted by the government, it is still illegal to compromise a device without
the consent of the user or the manufacturer.
In summary, both industry and academia have no solution that is simple to deploy, and at the
same time effective in addressing the problem.
In this paper, we propose a solution which defeats Mirai effectively and avoids aforementioned
issues. The key idea of our solution is to take advantage of human involvement in the least aggressive
way. The idea of kicking in human is based on the observation that rebooting the device also wipes
the Mirai code in memory. Based on this observation, we propose a collaborative defense strategy to
tackle Internet-of-Things (IoT) device based DDoS attacks. At a high-level, our solution resembles
the “white” Mirai work in that both utilize attacker’s method as a defense measure for tit for tat.
However, we require the customer to collaborate with the manufacture by rebooting the device at
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Table 1: Comparison of different solutions
Simplicity Effectiveness Manageableness
Recall 7 3 3
Customer Service 7 3 7
White Mirai 3 7 7
Our solution 3 3 3
the negotiated time slot. At this time slot, the malicious Mirai has very little chance to kick in,
while the “white” Mirai could “break” into the device in time. In particular, the manufacturer
builds an implanter server which remotely implants a virus expeller into a vulnerable device to
expel other Mirai away from it. Once implanted into a device, the virus expeller closes all the ports
used by malicious Mirai, leaving no room for Mirai to access this specific device. The implanter
server operated by the manufacturer is responsible for finding the vulnerable devices, implanting
the virus expeller and keeping the virus expeller alive in a specific device.
Table 1 compares our solution with three aforementioned solutions. In the table, simplicity means
there is no much burden for the customers and the manufacture to carry on the emendation. Effec-
tiveness means the solution can effectively defeat Mirai. Manageableness means the manufacturer
can keep track of the deployment of the system.
In summary, we make three main contributions in this paper:
1. We analyze the architecture of a legacy digital video recorder which is subject to the Mirai
attack.
2. We propose a practical solution to defeat Mirai the botnet malware, which is simple, effective
and manageable.
3. We implement a proof-of-concept prototype and show that it can successfully shield vulnerable
devices from Mirai’s infection.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work about
botnet, and security problems associated with the emerging IoT device. Then, in Section 3, we
present the architecture of the Mirai botnet, as well as a typical vulnerable device involved in the
Mirai attacks. Section 4 summaries key features of the Mirai botnet. The design and implemen-
tation are the proposed solution are demonstrated in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively. Then
we evaluate the effectiveness of the system in Section 7, followed by some discussions about the
limitation the work. Finally, Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
2.1 IoT Security
The Internet of Things are emerging nowadays. However, under the pressure of the time-to-market,
manufacturers of these IoT devices pay little attention to the security and privacy enhancement for
their products. This kind of neglect results in serious hazards and attacks [7, 11, 12, 22, 23, 14].
To tackle these problems, more and more security researchers in academia and industry focus on
IoT security.
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Pa et al.[21] analyzes the increasing threats against IoT devices and show that Telnet-based
attacks that target IoT device have increased since 2014. It proposes IoT honeypot and sand-
box on different CPU architectures to analyze the malware samples targeting Telnet-enabled IoT
devices. Fernandes et al.[15] provides the first depth of security analysis on the smart home pro-
gramming platform, i.e. Samsung-owned SmartThings, and discovers the over-privilege problem.
This problem can make a malicious battery monitor SmartApp subscribe door lock PIN change
event. To solve this problem, Jia et al.[18] propose a context-based permission system for appified
IoT platforms that helps users perform effective access control. Costin et al.[13] performs a large-
scale analysis of firmware images and discovered 38 previously unknown vulnerabilities in over 693
firmware images. For example, some devices’ firmware images hardcodes credentials. Fernandes et
al.[16] present FlowFence, using information flow approach within application structure to prevent
application misusing sensitive data in IoT devices. In our work, we target to defeat Mirai in a
simple, effective and manageable way. It helps manufacturers build an implanter server to implant
the virus expeller into vulnerable devices to immune Mirai’s infection and eventually stop Mirai
botnet’s attack.
2.2 Botnet
Botnet has been the research topic since 2000s. It can bring significant damages to the security of
both individuals and businesses. To counter botnet, there are usually two effective ways comprised
of preventing botnoet’s spreading and prevent botnet’s attack. Prevent botnet’s spreading often
needs the victim devices’ users or administrators to fix their devices’ vulnerabilities. Without the
capability of exploiting a specific vulnerability, the botnet cannot increase its size. This results in
the reduction of this botnet’s attack power.
There are tow most common strategies to prevent botnet’s attack. They are disabling C&C
servers and sinkholing the attack traffic [10, 19, 20]. Taking down C&C servers can defeat the
botnet, but just in a while. Because botnet attacker can change C&C servers periodically. Besides,
if the server are not in the scope of local law enforcement, it is not easy to do this. This way also
has a defect that even if C&C servers are taken down, the botnet’s zombies are still active in the
wild which can be reused later by others. Sinkholing the attack traffic happens when one botnet
is attacking a specific victim. It requires the cooperation of upstream Internet service providers,
such as ISP. It also needs to identify the unique signature of this traffic to be filtered. Our work
defeat Mirai by preventing its spreading by implanting the virus implanter into the device. In this
way, Mirai cannot infect this specific device and its size cannot increase.
3 Explaining Mirai
This section details Mirai’s design, which is helpful in understanding the proposed defense mecha-
nism. To begin with, we introduce a Mirai-vulnerable device.
3.1 Mirai-vulnerable Device
IoT devices subject to Mirai attacks are mainly IP Cameras and Digital Video Recorders (DVR).
These emerging devices are usually fragile and vulnerable, because very few security measure is
built into the system. To make things worse, many of these IoT devices run naked in the Internet
– back-door accounts can be used to remotely access the device with root privilege. In this section,
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Figure 1: Mirai’s infection process
we dissect a Dahua digital video recorder of model DH-3004, whose vulnerability statement is given
at the end.
Hardware. This device has four BNC connector for video input, and two for audio input. It also
has two USB ports for connecting peripheral like flash disks and a mouse. An Ethernet port is used
to connect to the Internet and a VGA port is used to connect a monitor. The device is powered by
an ARM ARM926EJ-S processor, with 43 MB of RAM. In addition, a hard disk can be plugged in
a SATA interface to record captured signals.
Software. The device runs HiLinux, a tailored Linux distribution, integrated with BusyBox as its
toolset. The kernel is a legacy one of version 2.6.24. By default, six TCP ports are open. They
are 23, 80, 101, 102, 554, and 6623. Some of them are used to telnet into the system for diagnose,
while others are used to connect a mobile app for remote control of the device. The system has a
root account with no password. Since the flash of the system is read-only, there is no way to set
up a new root password.
Vulnerability Statement. DH-3004 device has at least two ways for remote access, including
telnet and HTTP. Any one who can reach DH-3004 can login into the device with root privilege
through telnet access. As there is no way to set a root password, and firmware cannot be updated,
the device is highly vulnerable to Mirai attacks.
3.2 Mirai Analyses
As a botnet malware, Mirai uses the client-server (CS) model to connect the bot with a command
and control (C&C) server. However, compared with traditional botnet malwares, Mirai is special
in the infection phase. Instead of infecting directly through the bots, Mirai botnet is only used to
scan and collect vulnerable devices and the server launches the actual attack to implant botnets.
There are three modules in Mirai, a Bot module, a ScanListen module, and a Load module.
Figure 1 illustrates Mirai’s architecture, and the information flow and the relationship among these
modules. The Bot is a program running in victim devices. It scans other devices on the Intent
having the same vulnerability. If it finds one, the vulnerable device’s information will be uploaded
to the ScanListen module, which runs in a pre-known server. The information includes login
credentials, device IP address and vulnerable ports, etc. After receiving the these information, the
ScanListen module sends it to the Load module, which runs in the same server. The Load module
then use these information to infect the target device and implant Bot.
The Bot Module. This is the attack module which perform DDoS the actual attacks to the
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victim server. It is also used to scan the Internet to collect other vulnerable devices, and collect
their information. The Bot module implements features and functions listed below.
1. Preventing the device from rebooting. Mirai’s bot only exits in the memory. If the
device reboots, bot disappears. Therefore, in order to prevent this from happening, bot writes
the request command “0x80045704” to the “watchdog” of the device to disable rebooting in
face of a system hang up.
2. Process hiding. Mirai uses a random string to hide its process name.
3. Preventing second infection. The Bot module opens the port 48101 and binds to this
port. If another bot wants to bind this port, it would detect this event. In this way, mirai
ensures there is only one bot running on the target device.
4. Blocking ports. Mirai closes port 23(telnet), 22(ssh), 80(http) to block other botnet mal-
ware’s attack.
5. Experlling other malwares. Mirai’s bot module scans the system to find the fingerprint
of other malwares. With root previlege, Mirao is able kill other malware processes.
6. Device Scan. Mirai bot periodically, scans neighboring devices to discover vulnerable ones.
However, it excludes those device whose IP addresses belong to the General Electric Company,
Hewlett-Packard Company, US Postal Service, etc. as depicted in listing 1. If a vulnerable
device is fount, the bot module sends back this device’s information to the ScanListen module.
Bot uses brute-force to scan other devices. Namely, Bot hard-codes 62 pairs of back-doored
user name and password pair. Listing 2 lists the revealed username-password list. These
string is further obfuscated by a simple xor operation by “0xDEADBEEF”.
7. DDoS Attack. The bots connect to the C&C server and wait for the command to attack
the target server.
Listing 1: IP filter in bot
1 ...
2 while (o1 == 127 || //
127.0.0.0/8 - Loopback
3 (o1 == 0) || //
0.0.0.0/8 - Invalid address space
4 (o1 == 3) || //
3.0.0.0/8 - General Electric Company
5 (o1 == 15 || o1 == 16) || //
15.0.0.0/7 - Hewlett -Packard Company
6 (o1 == 56) || //
56.0.0.0/8 - US Postal Service
7 (o1 == 10) || //
10.0.0.0/8 - Internal network
8 (o1 == 192 && o2 == 168) || //
192.168.0.0/16 - Internal network
9 (o1 == 172 && o2 >= 16 && o2 < 32) || //
172.16.0.0/14 - Internal network
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10 (o1 == 100 && o2 >= 64 && o2 < 127) || //
100.64.0.0/10 - IANA NAT reserved
11 (o1 == 169 && o2 > 254) || //
169.254.0.0/16 - IANA NAT reserved
12 (o1 == 198 && o2 >= 18 && o2 < 20) || //
198.18.0.0/15 - IANA Special use
13 (o1 >= 224) || //
224.*.*.*+ - Multicast
14 (o1 == 6 || o1 == 7 || o1 == 11 || o1 == 21 || o1 == 22 || o1
== 26 || o1 == 28 || o1 == 29 || o1 == 30 || o1 == 33 || o1 == 55
|| o1 == 214 || o1 == 215) // Department of Defense
15 );
16 ...
Listing 2: Hardcoded usernames and passwords in bot
1 // Set up passwords
2 add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x5A\x41\x11\x17\x13\x13", 10);
// root xc3511
3 add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x54\x4B\x58\x5A\x54", 9);
// root vizxv
4 add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x43\x46\x4F\x4B\x4C", 8);
// root admin
5 add_auth_entry("\x43\x46\x4F\x4B\x4C", "\x43\x46\x4F\x4B\x4C", 7);
// admin admin
6 add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x5A\x4F\x4A\x46\x4B\x52\x41",
5); // root xmhdipc
7 add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "\x46\x47\x44\x43\x57\x4E\x56",
5); // root default
8 add_auth_entry("\x50\x4D\x4D\x56", "", 4);
// root (none)
9 ...
The ScanListen Module. This module is responsible for sending the information collected by
the bots to the Load module. The format is “IP-Address:Port” and “User-Name:Password”.
The Load Module. This module gets the input from ScanListen and performs attack against
each vulnerable devices. The critical steps are as following.
1. Login to the target device through exposed vulnerabilities.
2. Make sure the target device has BusyBox installed.
3. Find a read-writable directory.
4. Copy “/bin/echo” to the read-writable directory.
5. Implant bot through “echo”, “wget” or “tftp” commands by connecting a server.
6. Execute the bot program in memory.
7. Delete the bot program in the file system.
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4 Dissection of Mirai
This section dissects Mirai, lists some key features in the spread of Mirai, and argues some assump-
tions regarding the capabilities of customers.
Mirai is widely deployed in the wild [6] and there are thousands of Mirai bots on the Internet
scanning other vulnerable devices. The devices infected by Mirai have no way to update firmware.
In addition, most of them operate on a temporary in-memory file system, which loses its contents
after power off. By keeping track of each sold device, the device manufacturer can contact its
customers, e.g., by the email. The customer may not a power user, who has advanced computer
skills. We assume the customer is only capable of following the product manual to configure the
device and power on/off the device.
Although Mirai has an effective way to scan devices, the IP addresses are random chosen. There
should be a time window when the device is in clean state after rebooting.
The way Mirai deploys the botnet is straightforward. It first remotely exploits the weak-password
vulnerability, then implants the bot and waits for the command to attack the target server. In this
process, once implanted into a device, the bot closes several ports to disable remote access to the
device originated other malware. The bot also deletes the malicious executable binary on the file
system to conceal its presence.
From the aforementioned analyses on Mirai botnet, we figure out two key factors in the infection
of Mirai. They are the remote access and the hard-coded password vulnerability. Therefore, in
order to defeat Mirai, there are two effective ways, including fixing the password vulnerability and
closing the ports for remote access. As the device’s firmware cannot be updated, the password
vulnerability cannot be fixed permanently. In addition, the device may not support changing
password even temporarily. On the other hand, although closing the ports for remote access
cannot persist either, through collaboration between the customer and manufacture, it is possible
to minimum the time of vulnerable devices with open ports exposed on the Internet.
5 Desgin
The key idea of our solution is to use a “tit for tat” strategy to defeat Mirai. That is, the man-
ufacturer deploys a Mirai-like botnet system to implant virus expeller into the vulnerable devices
and close the ports for remote access to defeat Mirai automatically. Before illustrating the system,
we first discuss the challenges which can help understand the system design.
5.1 Challenges
The basic idea of our solution is also implanting a “white” Mirai to the vulnerable device. The first
challenge is how to control the infection range and the influence on the normal operations of the
devices. From the analysis above, Mirai uses bots to scan other devices and implants bots into the
vulnerable devices through the Load module automatically. When deploying the Mirai-like system,
we should consider the overhead that can bring to the Internet and the devices. For example,
these IP camera and DVR devices are usually resource-constrained. Exhausting device’s resource
to defeat Mirai is not acceptable for the customers. Besides, if a manufacturer scans the Internet
to discover the vulnerable devices of its own, this kind of spam stream may block some network
streams. Therefore, how to control the Mirai-like system to make it effective and bring minimum
influence on the Internet is very important.
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Figure 2: The Mirai-like system to defeat Mirai
The second challenge is how to ensure our “white” Mirai to be implanted into the target device
effectively. In section 4, we assume Mirai has been widely deployed in the wild and there are
thousands of bots to find the vulnerable devices. In fact, the botnet deployed by the attacker is
very large [6]. Mirai uses bot to scan the devices, so the larger the botnet is, the faster Mirai can
infect a new device. If the implanting of the manufacturer is not as efficient as the wild Mirai,
Mirai bot can infect a device earlier than ours. In this case, as the ports has been closed by Mirai’s
bot, our “white” Mirai cannot be implanted at all.
5.2 System Architecture
Figure 2 depicts the system design of our “white” Mirai and its difference with the original Mirai.
The gridded modules are those removed from the original Mirai. As our system derives from
Mirai, we must remove the code and modules designed to perform DDoS attacks to prevent our
benign system is abused. The gray modules are these newly added into the system. The two most
important modules include a virus expeller and a implanter server, which run on the vulnerable
device and the manufacture maintained server respectively.
The Virus Expeller. Once implanted into a vulnerable device, the virus expeller expels the
infection of Mirai’s bot. The virus expeller inherits code from Mirai’s bot, but distinguishes itself
from Mirai bot by removing the attack module and scan module. Besides, as depicted in figure 2,
the virus expeller also adds several functions, such as fingerprint obtaining module and heart-
beating module. Fingerprint obtaining module is responsible for collecting device’s information,
such as its unique ID. This module is used to avoid the legal problem. In particular, if the virus
expeller is injected into a vulnerable device which is produced by another manufacture, without
acknowledgment from the customer, legal problems arise. Therefore, the fingerprint obtaining
module can make sure the infected device belongs to the exact manufacturer.
The heart-beating module is a client program for the heartbeat service and reports aliveness
to it in the implanter server periodically. More details about this heartbeat functionality will be
described in section 5.2.
The virus expeller’s core part is a blocking module. It closes the ports for remote access as soon
as it is implanted into a device. However, there is a time window between this virus expeller is
executed and the ports are closed. This time window allows original Mirai to infect this specific
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device. Thus, the blocking module kills Mirai’s bot process if one is found.
As Mirai-like system deploys virus expellers in the resource-constraint devices, the resource used
in these devices should be restricted. Otherwise, the user may complain about this heavy-weighted
protection method. Because the scan module in the original Mirai’s bot consumes a lot of resources,
in order to limit the influence on the device, instead of performing scan on the device, we move
this function to the implanter server. Another benefit of removing the scan function is to avoid
generating much spam stream which has a bad influence on the Internet.
The Implanter Server. The implanter server runs five programs, including Load module, Scan-
Listen module, Heartbeat module, Scan module, and HTTP module.
The scan module inherits code from Mirai’s scan module. It is used to scan the Internet to find the
vulnerable devices. However, in order to implant the virus expeller only to the products of a specific
manufacturer, the scan module keeps this specific manufacturer’s information. Furthermore, this
module is extended and can scan an IP address range or a specific IP address to find vulnerable
devices.
The load module and the scanlisten module have no difference with Mirai’s load and scanlisten
modules. They are responsible for collecting the vulnerable devices’ information from the scan
service and implanting the virus expeller into these devices. The load module is also used for
downloading the executable payloads from a HTTP module on the server.
The heartbeat module monitors each virus expeller’s aliveness and re-implant them if some
accident happens, such as devices’ unplanned power-on and power-off, as this would clear the virus
expeller. There may be a concern in heartbeat service’s usage, i.e. whether these virus expellers
may results in a DDoS attack for this implanter server. But according to the material exposed by
Mirai’s authors [4], 2% CPU can support 400k bots. Therefore, this is not a problem.
5.3 Work Flow
The operation of our system has three phases, deployment phase, regular phase and negotiation
phase. Figure 3 illustrates how three phases work together to defeat Mirai attacks.
Deployment Phase. In this phase, the manufacturer deploys the system by firstly running the
scan service to find vulnerable devices and implant the virus expeller into them. This phase is a
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basic phase which is simple and straightforward. Its effectiveness depends on how quickly the scan
service can find vulnerable devices. In the real world, this phase may be optimistic. Because in
our assumption, Mirai is already deployed in the wild and all the devices on the Internet may be
infected by it. However, there should be some devices which are powered on and the time window
is long enough for this scan service to find them and implant the virus expeller.
Regular Phase. The manufacturer is not involved in this phase. In this phase, the heartbeat
client in the virus expeller sends back a heartbeat to the heartbeat service in the implanter server
periodically. At the same time, the heart-beating service has a timer for each virus expeller and
continuously checks them. If the timer exceeds a specific value, it means the related virus expeller
loses connection with the server. In this way, the manufacturer can know whether a virus expeller
has successfully ran on a specific device. If this device is accidentally rebooted, the manufacturer
can know exactly which device’s virus expeller loses connection with the heartbeat service. Then
the heartbeat service can invoke the scan service to scan a specific IP address range deduced from
the specific device information obtained previously, and can re-implant the virus expeller into the
device afterwards.
Negotiation Phase. In the last two phases, we implicitly assume that our Mirai-like system can
implant the virus expeller into a target device. However, in practice, as discussed in section 5.1,
Mirai botnet has a large number of bots and can already infect a target device. If Mirai bot has
already been in a device, no virus expeller can be implanted into this device. Because Mirai bot
firstly closes the ports for remote access, there is no other way to access this device. In order
to handle this situation, the customer must collaborate with the manufacturer to clear Mirai and
implant the virus expeller. In this phase, the customer and the manufacturer firstly agree on a
specific time. At that time slot, the user uses a computer, to access a special web page operated
by manufacturer, and then reboots the vulnerable device. The manufacturer can get a clue about
the IP range this specific user’s device is in. As a result, the manufacturer can leverage the scan
service to quickly scan the IP range to locate this vulnerable device and implant the virus expeller
before Mirai can infect this device. As the Mirai botnet does not know the time negotiated by
the customer and the manufacture, our solution can effectively block spread of original Mirai.
Furthermore, according to the experiment done by [8], it costs around 98 seconds for Mirai botnet
to infect a device after being connected to the Internet. So there is little chance for Mirai to infect
this device at the very moment that the customer reboots the device.
With regard to the IP range, we may need to consider different circumstances in reality. If a device
is in the private network and does not have a public IP address, it seems the Mirai-like system
cannot infect this device directly. However, the same applies to Mirai. Moreover, some devices
leverage UPnP (Universal Plug and Play) protocol to do NAT traversal and expose themselves on
the Internet for user convenience. As a result, the Mirai botnet can directly connect to this device
through the public IP address.
6 Implementation
Our implementation is based on the open-sourced Mirai code [9]. Mirai’s code base is more than
9K Lines Of Code (LOC), including C/C++, Go and Bourne Shell. As we remove attack modules
from Mirai and add heartbeat client/server modules, etc., the code base of our implementation is
about 6K LOC. In this section, we only describe the functions newly added into the virus expeller
and the implanter server.
11
6.1 The Virus Expeller
Two functions are added into the virus expeller, They are the fingerprint obtaining module and the
heart-beating module. The former gets system information from pseudo files, such as “/proc/cpuinfo”,
“/proc/hiversion”, etc. These information is used to determine whether this device is the product
of a specific manufacturer.
The heart-beating module is simple. It sends back a magic number “0xE84Eb1C8” to the heart-
beat service every minute to report the virus expeller’s aliveness.
6.2 The Implanter Server
The implanter server has been added two more services, including a scan service and heartbeat
service. The scan service inherits code from Mirai’s bot scan module. It is modified to scan a
specific manufacturer’s products with specific username-password pairs. This can accelerate the
scan speed and to some extent exclude other manufacturer’s products. Furthermore, in the original
Mirai’s bot, the scan module only get random IP addresses to scan. In ours, we only need to scan
a specific IP range obtained from the load module.
The heartbeat module is the server process for the heartbeat client in the virus expeller. It
records each virus expeller’s IP address, refreshes the timer for each virus expeller, and checks
the timer periodically. In our design, the heart-beating module checks the timer to see whether it
exceeds 70 seconds. If a timer exceeds the time limit, this module will invoke the scan service to
scan that specific IP address and the related IP address range to relocate this device, in case it is
accidentally rebooted.
7 Evaluation
We evaluate the functionality of the proposed Mirai-like system using the device mentioned in
section 3.1. The implanter server runs in a Debian 8 Linux operating system which is powered by
an Intel i7-4790 processors with 2GB memory.
We are interested in three functions. The first is whether the proposed system can implant the
virus expeller into a target device through this process: Scan → ScanListen → Load → Web →
Virus Expeller (in the target device) → Heartbeat. If the virus expeller is implanted into a device,
the heartbeat service can receive the messages sent by it. Using wireshark running on a PC which
monitors the network packages, we measured the time taken to implant the virus expeller since the
scan service starts to scan this device. On average, it takes about 10 seconds, which is much faster
than the wild Mirai does. After that, the heartbeat can periodically receive a message sent from
the virus expeller which shows that this system works.
The second is whether the virus expeller can defeat Mirai’s infection once being implanted into a
device. We run this experiment by implanting the virus expeller into this target device firstly and
then run the scan service to scan this specific device to find whether the load service can receive
any information. As our scan service, scanlisten service and load service inherit code from Mirai, if
our Mirai-like system can scan the device and return related information to the scanlisten service,
this means the target device can be infected by Mirai even there is a virus expeller inside. From
load service’s log message, we can directly find the virus expeller is implanted into this device and
no more message is generated after that. Besides, we try to use telnet to connect to this device and
fail to connect into this device. Therefore, once being implanted into a device, the virus expeller
can succeed in defeating Mirai by closing related remote access ports.
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The third is whether the implanter server can re-implant the virus expeller into this specific
device, if the device is accidentally rebooted. We run this experiment by rebooting the device and
monitor the log of the heartbeat service. From the log, we can see a list of operations. First, the
virus expeller stops sending back the aliveness message. Second, the heartbeat service invokes scan
service to scan the target IP address range. Third, the scan service finds the target device and the
virus expeller is implanted by the load service.
8 Discussion
8.1 Limitation of the Present Work
The proposed work implants a virus expeller into a target device to defeat the Mirai botnet malware.
Our system includes three phases, i.e. deployment phase, regular phase and negotiation phase. The
deployment phase is a basic phase which leverage the scan service to find vulnerable devices in the
Internet and the load service to implant the virus expeller. The regular phase is based on the
heartbeat module and scans service to keep the virus expeller implanted in the device. These
two phases potentially assume the Mirai-like system can implant the virus expeller into the target
device. But in the wild, there may be few devices left intact which result in the efficiency of these
two phases. The negotiation phase involves the device’s user, which introduces determinacy into
the system. However, the user may not be cooperative, which limits the efficiency of our system.
The proposed work only defeats the original Mirai botnet malware for now. This malware’
variants may use different ports or use different vulnerabilities to infect the target devices. For
different ports, this system can add them into the virus expeller’s port list which is easy to deploy.
For new vulnerabilities, our system can also defend the infection by closing the specific ports used
in these vulnerabilities. However, a port closed by the virus expeller may be a functional port used
by the device. When it is closed, the device’s function is influenced. For example, port 80 is used
by the DH-3004 device to show the web interface. If it is closed, the user can no longer access it.
With regards to the potential threat to the different participants, such as the user, the manu-
facturer, the ISP, etc., the only concern is the influence on the Internet and the device. As the
attack module has been remove from Mirai, our system cannot be abused. Besides, this system has
removed the scan module from the virus expeller. However, despite of the above mitigation, there
may still exist some influences on the Internet and the device.
There are also legal concerns related with the present work [3]. Although our system limit the
infection devices within this specific manufacturer’s products, the way it uses is still not decent.
Furthermore, different countries may have different laws to justify this behavior. Thus, our system
only works if the appropriate legal framework is in place to allow this behavior.
8.2 Future Work
The present work solves the problem that the Mirai botnet malware exploits the weak password
vulnerability in IoT devices to deploy botnet and perform DDoS attacks. It leverages Mirai’s code
base and implants the virus expeller into a target device to defeat Mirai. At present, our system
only works only if the target device is clean, i.e. Mirai has been cleared by rebooting or this device
has not been infected by Mirai at that time. In the future, we will assume that the device has
already been infected by Mirai. One potential solution is to discover Mirai’s vulnerability and
exploit this vulnerability to disarm Mirai.
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9 Conclusion
We have presented a new mechanism to aid manufacture in amending the Mirai-vulnerable devices
in the market. Different from recalling or customer services, in which customers are unwilling to
cooperate, our solution needs minimal involvement of customers. Different from the “white” Mirai
proposed in [17], our solution does not need brute-force scan to infect others, and can determinis-
tically patch the compromised device.
A proof-of-concept prototype has been implemented. Experimental results show that the pro-
posed solution is both simple and effective. Given the great number of Mirai-vulnerable devices
in the wild, our solution provides an attractive path towards mitigating the threats from Mirai,
until all the vulnerable devices are retired. Since our solution requires close cooperation with the
manufactures, we plan to contact the involved manufactures to further carry out our solution in
real world.
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